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Abstract
This article deals with the problem of optimal allocation of capital to corporate
bonds in fixed income portfolios when there is the possibility of correlated defaults.
Using a multivariate normal Copula function for the joint default probabilities we show
that retaining the first few moments of the portfolio default loss distribution gives an
extremely good approximation to the full solution of the asset allocation problem. We
provide detailed results on the convergence of the moment expansion and explore how
the optimal portfolio allocation depends on recovery fractions, level of diversification
and investment time horizon. Numerous numerical illustrations exhibit the results for
simple portfolios and utility functions.
1To appear in, Correlated Default Analysis for Collateralized Debt Obligations, edited by S. Das, G.
Fong and N. Kapadia.
1 Introduction
Investors routinely look to the corporate bond market in particular, and spread markets
in general, to enhance the performance of their portfolios. However, for every source of
excess return over the risk-free rate, there is a source of excess risk. When sources of
risk are correlated, the allocation decision to the risky sectors, as well as allocation to
particular securities in that sector, can be substantially different from the uncorrelated
case. Since the joint probability distribution of returns of a set of defaultable bonds varies
with the joint probabilities of default, recovery fraction for each bond, and the number of
defaultable bonds, a direct approach to the allocation problem that incorporates all these
factors completely can only be attempted numerically within the context of a default model.
This approach can have the short-coming of hiding the intuition behind the asset allocation
process in practice, which leans very heavily on the quantification of the first few moments,
such as the mean, variance and skewness. In this paper, we will take the practical approach
of characterizing the portfolio default loss distribution in terms of its moment expansion.
Focusing on allocation to corporate bonds (the analysis in this paper can be generalized
to any risky sector which has securities with discrete payoffs), we will answer the following
questions:
• In the presence of correlated defaults, how well does retaining the first few moments
of the portfolio default loss distribution do, for the portfolio allocation problem, as
compared to the more intensive full numerical solution?
• For different choices of correlations, probabilities of default, number of bonds in the
portfolio, and investment time horizon, how does the optimal allocation to the risky
bonds vary?
In this paper we consider portfolios consisting of risk free assets at a return y and
corporate zero coupon bonds with return ci for firm i, and study how correlations between
defaults affect the optimal allocation to corporate assets in the portfolio over some time
horizon T . We assume that if company i defaults at time t a fraction Ri (the recovery
fraction) of the value of its bonds is recovered and reinvested at the risk free rate. We will
quantify the impact of risk associated with losses from corporate defaults 2 on portfolio
allocation. To compensate the investor for default risk, the corporate bond’s return ci is
greater than that of the risk-free assets in the portfolio. The excess return, or spread of
investment in bonds of firm i can be decomposed into two parts. The first part of the spread,
which we call λi, arises as the actuarially fair value of assuming the risk of default. The
second part, which we call µi, is the excess risk premium that compensates the corporate
bond investor above and beyond the probabilistically fair value. In practice, µi can arise due
to a number of features not directly related to defaults. For example, traders will partition
µi into two pieces, one for liquidity and one for event risk, µi = li + ei. Most low grade
bonds may have a full percentage point arising simply from liquidity premia, and µi can
fluctuate to large values in periods of credit stress. Liquidity li is systematic and one would
expect it to be roughly equal for a similar class of bonds. Event risk ei contributes to µi due
2In this paper, we use annualized units so quoted default probabilities, hazard rates and corporate rates
are annualized ones.
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to the firm’s specific vulnerability to factors that affect it (e.g. negative press). In periods
of stress the default probabilities, li and ei all increase simultaneously, and the recovery rate
expectations Ri fall, leading to a spike in the overall spread. Since these variables can be
highly volatile, the reason behind the portfolio approach to managing credit is to minimize
the impact of non-systematic event risk in the portfolio.3 The excess risk premium itself is
not very stable over time. Empirical research shows that the excess risk premium might vary
from tens of basis points to hundreds of basis points. For instance, in the BB asset class, if
we assume a recovery rate of 50% and default probability of 2%, the actuarially fair value
of the spread is 100 basis points. However, it is not uncommon to find actual spreads of the
BB class to be 300 bp over treasuries [Altman (1989)]. The excess 200 bp of risk premium
can be decomposed in any combination of liquidity premium and event risk premium, and
is best left to the judgment of the market. When the liquidity premium component is small
compared to event risk premium, we would expect that portfolio diversification and the
methods of this paper are valuable.
One other factor needs to be kept in mind when comparing historical spreads to current
levels. In the late eighties and early nineties, the spread was routinely quoted in terms of
a treasury benchmark curve. However, the market itself has developed to a point where
spreads are quoted over both the libor swap rate and the treasury rate, and the swap rate
has gradually substituted the treasury rate as the risk-free benchmark curve. This has two
impacts. Firstly, since the swap spread (swap rate minus treasury rate for a given maturity)
in US is significant (of the order of 50 bp as of this writing), the excess spread needs to
be computed as a difference to the swap yield curve. Secondly, the swap-spread itself has
been very volatile during the last few years, which leads to an added source of non default
related risk in the spread of corporate bonds when computed against the treasury curve.
Thus, the 200 bp of residual spread is effectively 150 bp over the swap rate in the BB
example, of which, for lack of better knowledge, equal amounts may be assumed to arise
from liquidity and event risk premium over the long term. The allocation decision to risky
bonds strongly depends on the level of risk-aversion in the investor’s utility function, and
the required spread for a given allocation will go up nonlinearly as risk aversion increases.
The value of the optimal fraction of the portfolio in corporate bonds, here called αopt,
cannot be determined without knowing the excess risk premium part of the corporate re-
turns. They provide the incentive for a risk averse investor to choose corporate securities
over risk free assets. In this paper we explore, using utility functions with constant relative
risk aversion, the convergence of the moment expansion for αopt. Our work indicates that,
(for αopt less than unity) αopt is usually determined by the mean, variance and skewness
of the portfolio default loss probability distribution. The sensitivity to higher moments
increases as αopt does. Some measures of default risk, for example a VAR analysis
4, may be
more sensitive to the tail of the default loss distribution. We also examine how the optimal
portfolio allocation scales with the number of firms, time horizon and recovery fractions.
Historical evidence suggests that on average default correlations increase with the time
horizon5. For example, Lucas (1995) estimates that over one year, two year and five year
3The authors would like to thank David Hinman of PIMCO for enlightening discussions on this topic.
4See for example, Jorion (2001).
5 Zhou (2001) derives an analytic formula for default correlations in a first passage-time default model
and finds a similar increase with time horizon.
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time horizons default correlations between Ba rated firms are 2%, 6% and 15% respectively.
However, the errors in extracting default correlations from historical data are likely to be
large since defaults are rare. Also these historical analysis neglect firm specific effects
that may be very important for portfolios weighted towards a particular economic sector.
Furthermore, in periods of market stress default probabilities and their correlations increase
[Das, Freed, Geng and Kapadia (2001)] dramatically.
There are other sources of risk associated with corporate securities. For example, the
market’s perception of firm i’s probability of default could increase over the time horizon T
resulting in a reduction in the value of its bonds. For a recent discussion on portfolio risk
due to downgrade fluctuations see Dynkin, Hyman and Konstantinovsky (2002). Here we
do not address the issue of risk associated with fluctuations in the credit spread but rather
focus on the risk associated with losses from actual defaults.
In the next section a simple model for default is introduced. The model assumes a
multivariate normal Copula function for the joint default probabilities. In section 3 we
set up the portfolio problem. Moments of the fractional corporate default loss probability
distribution are expressed in terms of joint default probabilities and it is shown how these
can be used to determine αopt. In section 4 the impact of correlations on the portfolio
allocation problem is studied using sample portfolios where all the firms have the same
probabilities of default and the correlations between firms are all the same. The recovery
fractions are assumed to be zero for the portfolios in section 4. The impact of non-zero
recovery fractions on the convergence of the moment expansion is studied in section 5.
Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
This work is based on Wise and Bhansali (2002). It extends the results presented in
that paper to arbitrary time horizons (allowing default to occur at any time) and makes
more realistic assumptions for the consequences of default.
2 A Model For Default
It is convenient for discussions of default risk to introduce the random variables nˆi(ti).
nˆi(ti) takes the value 1 if firm i defaults in the time horizon ti and zero otherwise. The
joint default probabilities are expectations of products of these random variables,
Pi1...im(ti1 , . . . , tim) = E[nˆi1(ti1) · · · nˆim(tim)], when i1 6= i2 · · · 6= im. (1)
Pi(ti) is the probability that firm i defaults in the time period ti and Pi1,...,im(ti1 , . . . , tim)
is the joint probability that the m-firms i1, . . . im default in the times periods ti1 , . . . , tim .
We assume that the joint default probabilities are given by a multivariate normal Copula
function [See for example, Lee (2000)]. Explicitly,
P1...n(t1, . . . , tn) =
1
(2pi)
n
2
√
det ξ
∫
−χ1(t1)
−∞
dx1 · · ·
∫
−χn(tn)
−∞
dxn exp

−1
2
∑
ij
xiξ
(−1)
ij xj

 ,
(2)
where the sum goes over i, j = 1, . . . , n, and ξ
(−1)
ij is the inverse of the n × n correlation
matrix ξij. For n not too large the integrals in equation (2) can be done numerically or, since
defaults are rare, analytic results can be obtained using the leading terms in an asymptotic
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expansion of the integrals. The choice of a multivariate normal Copula function is common
but somewhat arbitrary. In principle the Copula function should be chosen based on a
comparison with data. For recent work along these lines see Das and Geng (2002).
In equation (2) the n×n correlation matrix ξij is usually taken to be the asset correlation
matrix. This has the advantage of allowing a connection to stock prices [Merton (1974)].
However this assumption is not necessary. For example the assets, aˆi could be functions
of normal random variables, aˆi = gi(zˆi). Suppose default occurs if the assets aˆi cross the
thresholds Ti. Then the condition for default on the normal production factor variables zˆi
is that they cross the thresholds g
(−1)
i (Ti). In such a model it is natural to interpret ξij
as the correlation matrix for the normal production factor variables zˆi. If the functions gi
are linear then the assets are also normal and their correlation matrix is also given by ξij .
However if the functions gi are not linear the joint probability distribution for the assets is
not multivariate normal and can have fat tails. Unless the gi are specified it is not possible
to connect stock prices to the correlation matrix ξij and the default thresholds χi. However,
even when the functions gi are not known the default thresholds or “equivalent distances
to default” χi(ti) and the correlation matrix ξij are determined by the default probabilities
Pi(ti) and the default correlations dij(t) and so have a direct connection to measures that
investors use in quantifying security risk. In our work we assume that the correlation matrix
is time independent.
Equation (2) in the case n = 1 gives,
Pi(ti) =
1
(2pi)
1
2
∫
−χi(ti)
−∞
dxi exp
[
−1
2
x2i
]
. (3)
Hence for an explicit choice for the time dependence of the default probabilities the default
thresholds are known. A simple (and frequently used) choice for the default probabilities is
Pi(ti) = 1− exp(−hiti), (4)
where the hazard rates hi are independent of time.
Since nˆi(ti)
2 = nˆi(ti) it follows that the correlation of defaults between two different
firms (which we choose to label 1 and 2) is,
d12(t) =
E[nˆ1(t)nˆ2(t)]− E[nˆ1(t)]E[nˆ2(t)]√
(E[nˆ1(t)2]−E[nˆ1(t)]2)(E[nˆ2(t)2]− E[n2(t)]2)
=
P12(t, t)− P1(t)P2(t)√
P1(t)(1 − P1(t))P2(t)(1− P2(t))
. (5)
The default model we are adopting is not as well motivated as a first passage-time default
model [Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), etc.]
where the assets undergo a random walk and default is associated with the first time that
the assets fall below the liabilities. However, it is very convenient to work with.
We will evaluate the integrals in equation (2) by numerical integration. For this we
need the inverse and determinant of the correlation matrix. It is very important that the
correlation matrix ξij is positive semi-definite. If it has negative eigenvalues the integrals
in equations (2) are not well defined. Typically a correlation matrix that is forecast using
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qualitative methods will not be mathematically consistent and have some negative eigen-
values. A practical method for constructing the consistent correlation matrix that is closest
to a forecasted one is given in Rebonato and Ja¨ckel (2000). For the portfolios discussed
in sections 4 and 5 the n × n correlation matrix ξij is taken to have all of its off diagonal
elements the same, i.e., ξij = ξ for i 6= j. Such a correlation matrix has one eigenvalue
equal to 1 + (n− 1)ξ and the others equal to 1− ξ. Consequently its determinant is
det[ξij] = (1− ξ)n−1[1 + (n− 1)ξ]. (6)
Its inverse has diagonal elements,
ξ
(−1)
ii =
1 + (n− 2)ξ
1 + (n− 2)ξ − (n− 1)ξ2 , (7)
and off diagonal elements (i 6= j),
ξ
(−1)
ij = −
ξ
1 + (n− 2)ξ − (n− 1)ξ2 . (8)
In the next section we consider the problem of portfolio allocation for portfolios con-
sisting of corporate bonds subject to default risk and risk free assets. The implications of
default risk are addressed using the model discussed in this section. Other sources of risk,
for example, systematic risk associated with the liquidity part of the excess risk premium,
are neglected.
3 The Portfolio Problem
Assume a zero coupon bond from company i grows in value (if it doesn’t default) at the
(short) corporate rate ci(t) and that if the company defaults a fraction Ri of the value of
that bond at the time of default is reinvested at the risk free (short) rate y(t). Then, the
random variable for the value of this bond at some time T in the future is,
Vˆi(T )
Vi(0)
= exp
(∫ T
0
dτci(τ)
)
(1− nˆi(T ))
+ Ri
∫ T
0
ds
dnˆi(s)
ds
exp
(∫ s
0
dτci(τ)dτ +
∫ T
s
dτy(τ)
)
, (9)
where Vi(0) is the initial value of the zero coupon bond. In equation (9) we have continuously
compounded the returns and we have assumed that T is less than or equal to the maturity
date of the bond6. Note that the random variable dnˆi(t)/dt is equal to the Dirac delta
function, δ(t− ti), if company i defaults at the time ti and is zero if it doesn’t default. The
first term in equation (9) gives the value if the company does not default before time T and
6Assuming that after maturity the value of a zero coupon corporate bond is reinvested at the risk free
rate it is straightforward to generalize the analysis of this paper to portfolios containing zero coupon bonds
with different maturities, some of which are less than the investment horizon. Similarly default risk for
portfolios containing coupon paying bonds can be studied since each coupon payment can be viewed as a
zero coupon bond.
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the second term (proportional to Ri) gives the value if the company defaults before time T .
The corresponding formula for a risk free asset is,
Vrf (T )
Vrf (0)
= exp
(∫ T
0
dτy(τ)
)
. (10)
Note that we are not treating the (short) risk free rate y(τ) as a random variable, although
it is certainly possible to generalize this formalism to do that. The (short) corporate rate
is decomposed as
ci(t) = y(t) + λi(t) + µi(t), (11)
where µi is the excess risk premium and λi is the part of corporate short rate that compen-
sates the investor in an actuarially fair way for the fact that the value of the investment
can be reduced through corporate default. In other words,
E[Vˆi(T )/Vi(0)]|µi=0 = Vrf (T )/Vrf (0). (12)
Taking the expected value equation (12) implies that
1 = (1− Pi(T )) exp
(∫ T
0
dτλi(τ)
)
+Ri
∫ T
0
ds
dPi(s)
ds
exp
(∫ s
0
dτλi(τ)
)
. (13)
Differentiation with respect to T gives
λi(T ) =
dPi(T )
dT
1−Ri
1− Pi(T ) . (14)
Using equation (4) for the time dependence of the probabilities of default equation (14)
implies the familiar relation
λi(T ) = hi(1−Ri). (15)
The above results imply that the total wealth, after time T , in a portfolio consisting of
risk free assets and zero coupon corporate bonds that are subject to default risk is (assuming
the bonds mature at dates greater than or equal to T )
Wˆ (T ) = W0 exp
(∫ T
0
dτy(τ)
)
×
[
(1− α) + α
(∑
i
fi exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
− lˆ(T )
)]
, (16)
where, W0 is the initial wealth, α is the fraction of corporate assets in the portfolio, lˆ(T ) is
the random variable for the fractional default loss over the time period T , Ri is the recovery
fraction and fi denotes the initial fraction of corporate assets in the portfolio that are in
firm i (
∑
i fi = 1). In equation (16) the sum over i goes over all N firms in the portfolio
and the default loss random variable is given by,
lˆ(T ) =
∑
i
fi
[
exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
nˆi(T )
− Ri
∫ T
0
ds
dnˆi(s)
ds
exp
(∫ s
0
dτ((λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)]
. (17)
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Integrating by parts,
lˆ(T ) =
∑
i
fi
[
exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
nˆi(T )(1 −Ri)
+ Ri
∫ T
0
dsnˆi(s)(λi(s) + µi(s)) exp
(∫ s
0
dτ((λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)]
. (18)
The expected value of lˆ(T ) is,
E[lˆ(T )] =
∑
i
fi
[
exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
Pi(T )
− Ri
∫ T
0
ds
dPi(s)
ds
exp
(∫ s
0
dτ((λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)]
. (19)
Fluctuations of the fractional loss lˆ(T ) about its average value are described by the variable,
δlˆ(T ) = lˆ(T )− E[lˆ(T )]. (20)
The mean of δlˆ is zero and the probability distribution for δlˆ determines the default risk of
the portfolio associated with fluctuations of the random variables nˆi(t). The moments of
this probability distribution are,
v(m)(T ) = E[(δlˆ(T ))m]. (21)
Using equation (1) and the property nˆi(t1)nˆi(t2) = nˆi(min[t1, t2]), the moments v
(m)(T )
can be expressed in terms of the joint default probabilities.
The random variable for the portfolio wealth at time T is,
Wˆ (T ) = W0 exp
(∫ T
0
dτy(τ)
)
[1 + αx(T ) − αδlˆ(T )], (22)
where,
x(T ) = −1 +
∑
fi exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
−E[lˆ(T )]. (23)
Using equations (13) and (19) we find that,
x(T) =
∑
i
fi
[
exp
(∫ T
0
dτµi(τ)
)
− 1
+ Ri
∫ T
0
ds
dPi(s)
ds
exp
(∫ s
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)(
1− exp
(∫ T
s
dτµi(τ)
))]
.(24)
Note that x(T ) vanishes if the excess risk premiums µi do.
To find out what value of α is optimal for some time horizon T a utility function
is introduced which characterizes the investor’s level of risk aversion. Here we use utility
7
functions of the type Uγ(W ) = W
γ/γ which have constant relative risk aversion7, 1−γ. The
optimal fraction of corporates, αopt, maximizes the expected utility of wealth E[Uγ(Wˆ (T ))].
Expanding the utility of wealth in a power series in δlˆ and taking the expected value gives
E[Uγ(Wˆ (T ))] = (W
γ
0 /γ) exp
(
γ
∫ T
0
dτy(τ)
)
(1 + αx(T ))γ
×
[
1 +
∞∑
m=2
Γ(m− γ)
Γ(−γ)Γ(m+ 1)
(
α
1 + αx(T )
)m
v(m)(T )
]
, (25)
where Γ is the Euler Gamma function. The approximate optimal value of α obtained from
truncating the sum in equation (25) at the m’th moment is denoted by αm. The focus of
this paper is on portfolios that are not leveraged and have αopt less than unity. We will
later see that typically, for such portfolios, the αm converge very quickly to αopt so that for
practical purposes only a few of the moments v(m) need be calculated. Note that the value
of αopt is independent of the risk free rate y(t).
The expressions for lˆ(T ) and x(T ) are complicated but they do simplify for short times
T or if all the recovery fractions are zero. For example, if T is small
lˆ(T ) ≃
∑
i
fi(1−Ri)nˆi(T ), (26)
and
x(T ) ≃
∑
i
fi
∫ T
0
dsµi(s). (27)
On the other hand if all the recovery fractions vanish (i.e. Ri = 0) then,
lˆ(T ) =
∑
i
fi exp
(∫ T
0
dτ(λi(τ) + µi(τ))
)
nˆi(T ), (28)
and
x(T ) =
∑
i
fi
[
exp
(∫ T
0
dτµi(τ)
)
− 1
]
. (29)
If x(T ) is zero then αopt is also zero. It is x(T ) that contains the dependence on the excess
risk premiums which provide the incentive for a risk adverse investor to choose corporate
bonds over risk free assets. An approximate formula for αopt can be derived by expanding
it in x(T ),
αopt =
∞∑
n=1
sn(T )
n!
x(T )n. (30)
The coefficients si(T ) can be expressed in terms of the moments, v
(m)(T ). Explicitly, for
the first two coefficients,
s1(T ) =
1
(1− γ)v(2)(T ) , (31)
7See, for example, Ingersoll (1987).
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and
s2(T ) = − (2− γ)v
(3)(T )
(1− γ)2(v(2)(T ))3 . (32)
For γ < 1 including the third moment reduces the optimal fraction of corporates when
v(3)(T ) is positive.
4 Sample Portfolios with Zero Recovery Fractions
Here we consider very simple sample portfolios where the correlations, default thresholds and
excess risk premiums are the same for all N firms in the portfolio i.e., ξij = ξ, χi(t) = χ(t)
and µi(t) = µ
8. Then all the probabilities of default are the same, Pi(t) = P (t), and
the joint default probabilities are also independent of which firms are being considered,
Pi1...im(t1, . . . tm) = P12...m(t1, . . . tm). The time dependence of the default probabilities is
taken to be given by equation (4). Given our assumptions the hazard rates are then also
independent of firm, hi = h. We also take the portfolios to contain equal assets in the
firms so that, fi = 1/N , for all i, and assume all the recovery fractions are zero. Since the
portfolio allocation problem does not depend on the risk free rate y or the initial wealth we
set y = 0 and W0 = 1.
With these assumptions the expressions for lˆ(T ) and x(T) become,
lˆ(T ) =
1
N
exp(hT + µT )
∑
i
nˆi(T ), (33)
and
x(T ) = exp(µT )− 1. (34)
For random defaults the probability of a fractional loss of lˆ = exp(hT + µT )n/N in
the time horizon T is (1 − P (T ))N−nP (T )nN !/(N − n)!n! and so the m’th moment of the
default loss distribution is
v(m)(T ) = exp(mhT +mµT )
N∑
n=0
(
n
N
− P (T )
)m
(1− P (T ))N−nP (T )n N !
(N − n)!n! . (35)
The expected utility of wealth is
E[Uγ(Wˆ (T ))] =
1
γ
N∑
n=0
(1− P (T ))N−nP (T )n N !
(N − n)!n!
×
(
1 + αx(T )− α
(
n
N
− P (T )
)
exp(hT + µT )
)γ
. (36)
Having the explicit expression for the utility of wealth in equation (36) lets us compare
results of the moment expansion for the optimal fraction of corporates αm with the all
orders result, αopt. These are presented in Table I in the case h = 0.02, µ = 100bp and
8We also assume that µ is independent of time.
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γ = −4. Results for different values of the number of firms N and different time horizons
T are shown in Table I. We also give in columns three and four of Table I the volatility
vol =
√
v(2)(T ), (37)
and skewness
skew =
v(3)(T )√
v(2)(T )
3 , (38)
of the portfolio default loss probability distribution.
Increasing N gives a larger value for the optimal fraction of corporates because diversi-
fication reduces risk. This occurs very rapidly with N . For N = 1, µ = 100bp, T = 1yr and
γ = −4 the optimal fraction of corporates is only 7.7%. By N = 10 increasing the number
of firms has reduced the portfolio default risk so much that the 100bp excess risk premium
causes a portfolio that is 76% corporates to be preferred.
For all the entries in Table I the moment expansion converges very rapidly, although for
low N it is the small value of αopt that is driving the convergence. Since in equation (25) the
term proportional to v(m) has a factor of αm accompanying it we expect good convergence
of the moment expansion at small α.
The focus of this paper is on portfolios that are not leveraged and have αopt < 1. But a
value αopt > 1 is not forbidden when finding the maximum of the expected utility of wealth.
This occurs at lowest order in the moment expansion in the last row of Table I.
Table I: Optimal Fraction of Corporates for Sample Portfolios with Random (ξ = 0)
Defaults. Other parameters used are: h = 0.02, γ = −4 and µ = 100bp.


T N vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5 αopt
1yr 1 0.14 6.9 0.098 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.077
1yr 5 0.064 3.1 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38
1yr 10 0.045 2.2 1.0 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.76
5yr 1 0.34 2.8 0.090 0.074 0.072 0.072 0.072
5yr 5 0.15 1.2 0.49 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.36
5yr 10 0.11 0.87 1.1 0.85 0.75 0.73 0.71


Next we consider the more typical case where there are correlations, ξ 6= 0. Table IIa
gives values of α2 to α5 for T = 1yr, µ = 100bp, h = 0.02 and γ = −4. Portfolios with
N = 10, 50 and 100 are considered and values for ξ between 0.5 and 0.25 are used.
Again the convergence of the moment expansion is quite good. Although just including
the variance (i.e. α2) can be off by almost a factor of two α3 is usually a reasonable
approximation to the true optimal fraction of corporates. The convergence is worse the
larger the value of αopt and for values of αopt less than 40% we find that α3 is within about
10% of αopt.
In the last row of Table IIa the value of α5 is equal to unity. However, we know that the
true value of αopt must be less than unity. For α = 1 there is some finite (but tiny) chance
of the investor loosing all his wealth and for γ < 0 the utility of zero wealth is −∞.
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Table IIa: Moment Expansion for Optimal Portfolio with Correlated Defaults for T = 1yr,
µ = 100bp, h = 0.02 and γ = −4.


T N µ ξ dij vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5
1yr 10 100bp 0.50 0.152 0.070 5.2 0.42 0.31 0.29 0.29
1yr 10 100bp 0.45 0.126 0.066 4.9 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.32
1yr 10 100bp 0.40 0.102 0.063 4.5 0.52 0.39 0.36 0.36
1yr 10 100bp 0.35 0.082 0.060 4.2 0.57 0.43 0.40 0.40
1yr 10 100bp 0.30 0.064 0.057 3.8 0.63 0.48 0.45 0.44
1yr 10 100bp 0.25 0.049 0.054 3.5 0.70 0.53 0.50 0.49
1yr 50 100bp 0.50 0.152 0.059 5.5 0.59 0.42 0.38 0.37
1yr 50 100bp 0.45 0.126 0.054 5.2 0.70 0.49 0.45 0.43
1yr 50 100bp 0.40 0.102 0.050 4.8 0.84 0.58 0.53 0.51
1yr 50 100bp 0.35 0.082 0.045 4.4 1.0 0.70 0.63 0.61
1yr 50 100bp 0.30 0.064 0.041 4.0 1.2 0.85 0.77 0.74
1yr 50 100bp 0.25 0.049 0.037 3.6 1.5 1.1 0.94 0.90
1yr 100 100bp 0.50 0.152 0.057 5.6 0.62 0.44 0.40 0.39
1yr 100 100bp 0.45 0.126 0.053 5.3 0.75 0.52 0.47 0.45
1yr 100 100bp 0.40 0.102 0.048 5.0 0.91 0.62 0.56 0.54
1yr 100 100bp 0.35 0.082 0.043 4.6 1.1 0.76 0.68 0.65
1yr 100 100bp 0.30 0.064 0.039 4.2 1.4 0.94 0.84 0.80
1yr 100 100bp 0.25 0.049 0.035 3.8 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.0


Correlations dramatically effect the dependence of the optimal portfolio allocation on
the total number of firms. For the ξ = 0.5 entries in Table IIa the optimal fraction of
corporates is, 0.29, 0.37, and 0.39 for N = 10, 50 and 100 respectively. For N = 10, 000
we find that α5 = 0.40. Increasing the number of firms beyond 100 only results in a small
increase in the optimal fraction of corporates. When defaults are random the moments of
the portfolio default loss distribution go to zero as N → ∞. For example, with ξ = 0 the
variance of the default loss distribution is,
v(2) = exp(2hT + 2µT )
P (1 − P )
N
, (39)
and the skewness of the default loss distribution is
v(3)
(v(2))3/2
=
1√
NP (1− P )(1− 2P ). (40)
For random defaults as N → ∞ the distribution for δlˆ approaches the trivial one where
δlˆ = 0 occurs with unit probability. However, for ξ > 0 the moments v(m) go to non-
zero values in the limit N → ∞ and the default loss distribution remains non-trivial and
non-normal.
In Table IIb the time horizon is changed to T = 5yr but the other parameters are left
the same as in Table IIa. The value of αopt is always smaller than in Table IIa indicating
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that the compounding of the excess risk premium does not completely compensate for
the added risk associated with the greater probability of default. The convergence of the
moment expansion and the dependence of the optimal fraction of corporates on the number
of bonds is similar to that in Table IIa.
Table IIb: Moment Expansion for Optimal Portfolio with Correlated Defaults for T = 5yr,
µ = 100bp, h = 0.02 and γ = −4.


T N µ ξ dij vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5
5yr 10 100bp 0.50 0.246 0.193 2.3 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.20
5yr 10 100bp 0.45 0.213 0.184 2.2 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.22
5yr 10 100bp 0.40 0.182 0.175 2.1 0.36 0.27 0.25 0.25
5yr 10 100bp 0.35 0.153 0.166 2.0 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.27
5yr 10 100bp 0.30 0.127 0.158 1.9 0.45 0.34 0.31 0.31
5yr 10 100bp 0.25 0.102 0.149 1.8 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.34
5yr 50 100bp 0.50 0.246 0.174 2.4 0.36 0.27 0.25 0.24
5yr 50 100bp 0.45 0.213 0.163 2.3 0.42 0.31 0.28 0.28
5yr 50 100bp 0.40 0.182 0.152 2.2 0.49 0.35 0.32 0.31
5yr 50 100bp 0.35 0.153 0.141 2.1 0.58 0.41 0.38 0.36
5yr 50 100bp 0.30 0.127 0.129 2.0 0.71 0.49 0.44 0.43
5yr 50 100bp 0.25 0.102 0.118 1.8 0.89 0.60 0.54 0.51
5yr 100 100bp 0.50 0.246 0.172 2.4 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.25
5yr 100 100bp 0.45 0.213 0.160 2.3 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.28
5yr 100 100bp 0.40 0.182 0.149 2.2 0.52 0.37 0.33 0.33
5yr 100 100bp 0.35 0.153 0.137 2.1 0.62 0.43 0.39 0.38
5yr 100 100bp 0.30 0.127 0.125 2.0 0.76 0.52 0.47 0.45
5yr 100 100bp 0.25 0.102 0.113 1.8 0.98 0.65 0.57 0.54


Table IIb indicates that the volatility of the portfolio default loss probability distribution
increases as the time horizon increases and the skewness decreases as the time horizon in-
creases. The same behavior occurs for random defaults and this can be seem from equations
(39) and (40) with the small probability of default P increasing with time.
Next we consider the effect of changing the utility function to one with a lower level
of risk aversion. In Table III γ = −2 is used. Equation (31) suggests that an excess
risk premium of 60bp would yield roughly the same portfolio allocation as the excess risk
premium of 100bp used in Tables II. In Table III we consider portfolios with 100 firms and
take the same parameters as in Table IIa apart from the lower level of risk aversion, γ = −2
and the lower excess risk premium. µ = 60bp.
It is not surprising that the values of α2 in Table III are close to those in Table IIa.
However, α5 is typically about 10% larger than in Table IIa. The convergence of the moment
expansion is better in Table III than in Table IIa.
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Table III: Moment Expansion for Optimal Portfolio with Correlated Defaults for T = 1yr,
N = 100, µ = 60bp, h = 0.02, and γ = −2.


T N µ ξ dij vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5
1yr 100 60bp 0.50 0.152 0.057 5.6 0.62 0.47 0.45 0.44
1yr 100 60bp 0.45 0.126 0.053 5.3 0.74 0.56 0.53 0.52
1yr 100 60bp 0.40 0.102 0.048 5.0 0.90 0.68 0.63 0.62
1yr 100 60bp 0.35 0.082 0.043 4.6 1.1 0.82 0.76 0.74
1yr 100 60bp 0.30 0.064 0.039 4.2 1.4 1.0 0.94 0.92
1yr 100 60bp 0.25 0.049 0.035 3.8 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1


The examples in this section have all used an annualized hazard rate of 2%, however, the
convergence of the moment expansion is similar for significantly larger default probabilities.
In Table IV the convergence of the moment expansion is examined for portfolios with 100
corporate bonds and hazard rates of 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, and 10%. The value of ξ is fixed at
0.50 and the time horizon is 1yr. The convergence of the moment expansion is good for all
the values of h used in Table IV.
For longer time horizons the increased default risk is not compensated for by the com-
pounding of the excess risk premium. For example if we take the parameters of the last row
of Table IV but increase the time horizon to T = 5yr then, α2 = 0.25, α3 = 0.21, α4 = 0.18
and α5 = 0.17.
Table IV: Probability of Default and Convergence of the Moment Expansion for T = 1yr,
ξ = 0.50, N = 100 and γ = −4.


T h µ ξ dij vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5
1yr 0.02 100bp 0.50 0.152 0.057 5.6 0.62 0.44 0.40 0.39
1yr 0.04 200bp 0.50 0.189 0.092 4.0 0.50 0.36 0.33 0.32
1yr 0.06 300bp 0.50 0.214 0.121 3.2 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.29
1yr 0.08 500bp 0.50 0.231 0.148 2.7 0.52 0.35 0.32 0.31
1yr 0.10 600bp 0.50 0.246 0.173 2.4 0.46 0.32 0.29 0.28


5 Sample Portfolios with Non-Zero Recovery Fractions
In this section we consider portfolios like those in section 4 but allow the recovery fractions
Ri = R to be nonzero. Here we focus on short time horizons using the approximate formulas,
lˆ(T ) = (1−R)nˆi(T ), (41)
and
x(T ) = µT, (42)
appropriate to that regime. Recall that if R is not zero the actuarially fair corporate spread
is λ = h(1 − R). Table V shows the impact of nonzero recovery on αopt. The parameters
13
used are γ = −4, T = 1yr, N = 10, R = 0.5, h = 0.04 and µ = 50 and 100bp. Doubling the
hazard rate to 0.04 gives an actuarially fair corporate spread of 200bp, which is the same
as in Tables II. Note that even though the actuarially fair spread in Table V is the same as
in Table IIa nonzero recovery reduces the default risk and so the excess risk premium must
be reduced by a factor of two to get values of αopt close to those in Table IIa.
Table V: Recovery and the Moment Expansion for Optimal Portfolio with Correlated
Defaults using T = 1yr, N = 10, h = 0.04, R = 0.5 and γ = −4.


T N µ ξ dij vol skew α2 α3 α4 α5
1yr 10 50bp 0.50 0.152 0.050 4.6 0.40 0.32 0.31 0.31
1yr 10 50bp 0.45 0.126 0.048 4.5 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.34
1yr 10 50bp 0.40 0.102 0.046 4.3 0.49 0.39 0.38 0.38
1yr 10 50bp 0.35 0.082 0.043 4.2 0.54 0.44 0.42 0.42
1yr 10 50bp 0.30 0.064 0.041 4.0 0.60 0.48 0.47 0.46
1yr 10 50bp 0.25 0.049 0.039 3.8 0.67 0.54 0.52 0.51
1yr 10 100bp 0.50 0.152 0.050 4.6 0.81 0.57 0.53 0.52
1yr 10 100bp 0.45 0.126 0.048 4.5 0.90 0.63 0.59 0.57
1yr 10 100bp 0.40 0.102 0.046 4.3 1.0 0.70 0.65 0.63
1yr 10 100bp 0.35 0.082 0.043 4.2 1.1 0.78 0.72 0.70
1yr 10 100bp 0.30 0.064 0.041 4.0 1.2 0.86 0.80 0.78
1yr 10 100bp 0.25 0.049 0.039 3.8 1.4 0.96 0.88 0.86


For random defaults one can easily see why recovery reduces portfolio default risk.
Taking the hazard rate to be small, the time horizon to be short and the defaults to be
random,
v(2)(T ) ≃ (1−R)λT
N
, (43)
and
v(3)(T )
(v(2)(T ))3/2
≃
√
1−R
NλT
, (44)
where λ is the actuarially fair spread. Hence with λ held fixed the variance and skewness
of the portfolio default loss probability distribution decrease as R increases.
Since we are using the approximate formulas in equations (41) and (42) we would not
get exact agreement with Table IIa even if R = 0. For example with T = 1yr, N = 10,
γ = −4, µ = 100bp, h = 0.02, ξ = 0.5 and R = 0 using equations (41) and (42) yields,
α2 = 0.44, α3 = 0.33, α4 = 0.31 and α5 = 0.30. On the other hand the first row of Table
IIa is, α2 = 0.42, α3 = 0.31, α4 = 0.29 and α5 = 0.29.
6 Concluding Remarks
Default correlations have an important impact on portfolio default risk. Given a default
model the tail of the default loss probability distribution is difficult to compute, often
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involving numerical simulation9 of rare events. The first few moments of the default loss
distribution are easier to calculate, and in the default model we used this computation
involved some simple numerical integration. More significantly, the first few terms in the
moment expansion have a familiar meaning. Investors are used to working with the classic
mean, variance and skewness measures and have developed intuition for them and confidence
in them. In this paper we studied the utility of the first few moments of the default loss
probability distribution for the portfolio allocation problem.
The default model we use assumes a multivariate normal Copula function. However, the
corporate assets themselves are not necessarily normal or lognormal and their probability
distribution can have fat tails. When there are correlations the portfolio default loss dis-
tribution does not approach a trivial10 or normal probability distribution as the number of
firms in the portfolio goes to infinity. Correlations dramatically decrease the effectiveness
of increasing the number of firms, N , in the portfolio to reduce portfolio default risk.
We explored the convergence of the moment expansion for the optimal fraction of cor-
porate assets αopt. Our work indicates that, for αopt less than unity, the convergence of the
moment expansion is quite good. The convergence of the moment expansion gets poorer
as αopt gets larger. We also examined how αopt depends on the level of risk aversion, the
recovery fraction and investment time horizon.
The value of αopt depends on the utility function used. In this paper we used utility
functions with constant relative risk aversion, 1 − γ. It is possible to make other choices
and while the quantitative results will be different for most practical purposes we expect
that the general qualitative results should continue to hold.
Our main conclusions from the examples in Sections 4 and 5 are:
• In the presence of correlated defaults, the default loss distribution is not normal.
Nevertheless we find that retaining just the first few moments of the default loss
probability distribution yields a good estimate of the optimal fraction of corporates.
As αopt gets smaller the convergence of the moment expansion improves. For the
examples in sections 4 and 5 with αopt near 40% retaining just the mean, variance and
skewness of the default loss probability distribution determined αopt with a precision
better than about 15%.
• For small numbers of corporate bonds increasing the number of firms decreases port-
folio default risk. However, correlations cause this effect to saturate as the number
of bonds increases and for the examples in sections 4 and 5 (with production factor
or asset correlations 0.50 ≥ ξ ≥ 0.25) the optimal fraction of corporates does not
increase significantly if N is increased beyond 100 firms.
• Increasing the recovery fractions decreases portfolio risk and this is true even when the
probabilities of default increase so that the actuarially fair spreads remain constant.
• With probabilities of default given by Pi(T ) = 1 − exp(−hiT ) and the hazard rates
hi constant, continuously compounding of a constant excess risk premium does not
exactly compensate for the increase in the default probability with time. The optimal
9See, for example, Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Das, Fong and Geng (2001).
10The trivial distribution has δlˆ = 0 occuring with unit probability.
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fraction of corporates decreased in going from a T = 1yr to a T = 5yr investment
horizon.
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